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Abstract Although agency disclosure is required by every state, recent
national surveys of home buyers and sellers indicate that
disclosure varies signiﬁcantly across the United States. This
study seeks to determine the causes of these disparities by
examining states’ educational standards, disclosure forms,
regulatory environments, and buyer characteristics. The results
identify several variables that have a deterministic impact on the
probability of disclosure and suggest corrective actions and
policies that states can implement to improve the effectiveness
of agency disclosure in the real estate transaction.
In the past, it has generally been assumed that the passage of mandatory agency
disclosure statutes by states solved many of the problems buyers encountered
when they were unaware of the nature of the agency arrangement that existed
between sellers and their brokers. The underlying rationale for the passage of
disclosure statutes was that a better informed public would be better able to protect
itself and make more informed choices regarding broker representation. However,
a recent study by Wiley and Zumpano (2006) points out that compliance with
agency disclosure rules is far from universal. In particular, the level of reported
agency disclosure is found to vary signiﬁcantly across homebuyer demographics,
as well as from one state to the next, with buyers in some states reporting
disclosure less than two-thirds of the time. The obvious question that must be
asked then is why reported disclosure rates are so low despite the fact that agency
disclosure is required by statute in every state in the United States. While part of
the problem may be due to comprehension, rather than noncompliance—a large
number of homebuyers surveyed did not know or were unsure that they received
an agency disclosure document. Such uncertainty among prospective buyers is
indicative of serious difﬁculties with the agency disclosure system.
The purpose of this research is to examine the factors that might be contributing
to the low incidence of reported disclosure and, in the process, identify policies266  Wiley and Zumpano
that states can employ to improve the incidence of agency disclosure within their
respective jurisdictions. This study uses data from the National Association of
Realtors (NAR) Homebuyers and Sellers surveys and data from the Association
of License Law Ofﬁcials (ARELLO), as well as hand-collected data characterizing
state disclosure policies. In addition to the demographic and experience
characteristics of home buyers, we consider a number of factors that may explain
the variation in disclosure rates from one state to the next. These include factors
that are unique to each state such as the adoption of a standard disclosure
form, the required timing and acknowledgement of disclosure, the size and
organizational structure of the real estate regulatory board, as well as current
professional education standards.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss related research
and provide some historical perspective on agency disclosure problems within the
context of a real estate purchase transaction. The model and methodology used in
this research are described in Section 3, while variables that could have a
systematic impact on the incidence of agency disclosure are identiﬁed and
described in Section 4. The model is estimated and the empirical ﬁndings
are analyzed in Section 5. The paper concludes with a summary of the
conclusions of this study and the policy recommendations that follow from this
research.
 Background
In 1984, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC, 1984) published a landmark ﬁve-
year study of the residential brokerage industry that provided evidence that buyers
commonly misunderstand the legal nature of their relationship with real estate
agents. Among its more notable ﬁndings, the report found that in multiple listing
situations, which represent a majority of all residential real estate transactions,
74.2% of buyers believed that the agent they were working with represented them,
when, in fact, the agent represented the seller.1 In point of fact, this perception
was inconsistent with what was then the conventional agency representation model
advocated by the NAR and upheld by the courts where the listing and selling
brokers represented the seller. Absent a written buyer agency agreement, real estate
agents were legally considered ﬁduciaries of the seller, and agents working with
buyers (selling agents) under multiple listings arrangements were deemed
subagents of the listing broker. Obviously such misunderstandings concerning the
role of the real estate broker could prove very damaging to consumers.
The FTC (1984) study found that many buyers acknowledged providing material
information to the agent, such as the highest amount they would be willing to bid
for the property. Yet, under the common law of agency, brokers were agents ofAgency Disclosure in the Real Estate Transaction  267
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the seller and were obligated to pass on any relevant information to their seller
clients. Clearly this situation could compromise the negotiating position of
interested buyers who commonly believed that the broker would keep this
information conﬁdential.
Following the release of the FTC study, there was a great deal of attention devoted
to agency problems among consumer advocacy groups, academics, lawyers, and
brokers within the real estate community. In 1985, a NAR taskforce looked into
the problems and recommended that all states implement mandatory agency
disclosure statutes. As a result, every state now requires some form of agency
disclosure. As more buyers learned that they lacked representation when
negotiating the purchase of home, states began passing laws allowing for
alternative forms of representation, such as buyer representation, dual agency, and
non-agency transaction brokerage.2
Many thought the problem solved, and until recently there was limited data
available to determine the effectiveness of agency disclosure laws. In a recent
study, Wiley and Zumpano (2006) used data from a 2004 survey to ﬁnd that
agency disclosure at the national level was reported by buyers less than 75% of
the time. Their research provided evidence that ﬁrst-time homebuyers, buyers aged
65 and older, Hispanics, and Asians were signiﬁcantly less likely to report being
provided with written disclosure compared to other segments of the home-buying
population. In addition, Wiley and Zumpano (2006) documented substantial
variation in the reported levels of agency disclosure from one state to the next.
Thus far, however, no research has attempted to empirically model or explain this
variation in disclosure rates across the U.S.3
 The Model
In our research, binary logistic regression analysis is used to isolate factors that
can have a deterministic impact on the probability of agency disclosure. A number
of these factors have shown up in related research, while other variables are chosen
for consideration based upon conceptual and a priori expectations about what
might inﬂuence the probability of agency disclosure.
The dependent variable in the models estimated here is Disclosure, which is equal
to 1 if a buyer acknowledges that they received written agency disclosure during
a real estate purchase transaction, and zero otherwise. The independent variables
contain vectors of buyer characteristics, licensee education requirements, exam
content variables, characteristics of the disclosure forms used, as well as regulatory
and enforcement considerations. The model to be estimated is:268  Wiley and Zumpano
Disclosure      Y2002    Y2003    Y2004 01 2 3
   Y2005    Y2006    Buyer Rep 456
   First Home    65&Older 78
   Asian    Hispanic 91 0
   Standardized Form 11
   Early Disclosure    Verbal Only 12 13
   (60 Hours)    Disclosure Section 14 15
  Broker Dominated 16
   Regulatory Staff  . 17 (1)
Deﬁnitions of the variables used in the estimations are provided in Exhibit 1.
Detailed descriptions of these regressors and justiﬁcations for their inclusion in
the models are provided in the next section.
 Description of the Variables
The primary source of data used in this study comes from the NAR’s annual
Home Buyers and Selling Process surveys for years 2001 to 2006, accounting for
32,624 total responses. The survey is administered annually and contains more
than 100 questions, providing a detailed description of each transaction.4 While
the questions and numbering change somewhat from one year to the next, the
responses considered in this study appear consistently throughout the sample
period.
Each year the survey asks homebuyers if they received a written form of agency
disclosure during the transaction. Possible responses include ‘‘Yes, at ﬁrst
contact,’’ ‘‘Yes, when contract written,’’ ‘‘No,’’ or ‘‘Don’t know/Not sure.’’ The
sample used in this paper considers only responses where the agency disclosure
question is answered. Responses of ‘‘Don’t know/Not sure’’ are indeterminate in
nature and omitted as we are only concentrating on respondents who either
acknowledged or denied receiving a written disclosure statement.5
For obvious reasons, only responses for buyers who reported purchasing their
home ‘‘through a real estate agent/broker’’ are considered. Finally, the sample is
limited to include only respondents who answered survey questions concerning
their age, race, home buying experience, type of buyer representation (if any), as
well as information about the state in which they purchased their home. Each
model controls for the buyer characteristics found by Wiley and Zumpano (2006)Agency Disclosure in the Real Estate Transaction  269
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Exhibit 1  Variable Legend
Variable Description
Disclosure Equals 1 if the buyer acknowledged receiving a written agency
disclosure during the transaction.
Y2002 Equals 1 for responses from the 2002 NAR HBS survey data.
Y2003 Equals 1 for responses from the 2003 NAR HBS survey data.
Y2004 Equals 1 for responses from the 2004 NAR HBS survey data.
Y2005 Equals 1 for responses from the 2005 NAR HBS survey data.
Y2006 Equals 1 for responses from the 2006 NAR HBS survey data.
Buyer Rep Equals 1 if the buyer acknowledged some form of buyer representation.
First Home Equals 1 if the buyer is a ﬁrst time homebuyer.
65&Older Equals 1 if the buyer is at least 65 years old.
Asian Equals 1 if the buyer reports their nationality as exclusively Asian/
Paciﬁc Islander.
Hispanic Equals 1 if the buyer reports their nationality as exclusively Hispanic/
Latino.
Standardized Form Equals 1 if the state-level real estate commission adopted an agency
disclosure form.
Early Disclosure Equals 1 if the state requires agency disclosure at the earliest practical
point.
Verbal Only Equals 1 if the state allows for a verbal presentation of agency
disclosure only.
60 Hours Equals 1 if the state requires more than 60 hours of pre-license
education for real estate salespersons.
Disclosure Section Equals 1 if there is some reference to agency disclosure in the content
outline of the candidate exam handbook [from Pancak and Sirmans
(2007)].
Broker Dominated Equals 1 if the state requires at least four-ﬁfths of the commissioners to
hold active real estate licenses.
Regulatory Staff Average annual employees of the regulatory authority per 1,000 active
salespersons.
to have a signiﬁcant relationship with the dependent variable. Categorical variables
are included to account for different survey years, 2002 through 2006. The
inclusion of these variables allows us to determine whether the incidence of
disclosure changes over time. It is measured relative to the ﬁrst year of survey
data available (survey year 2001).
Additional data on the number of real estate transactions, by state, and the size
of state real estate regulatory agencies was collected from annual issues of the
Digest of Real Estate License Laws and Current Issues published by the270  Wiley and Zumpano
Association of License Law Ofﬁcials (ARELLO). The remainder of the data
needed to estimate the model had to be largely created from primary sources.
Current disclosure practices were examined in detail for each state. This involved
individually locating and examining agency disclosure statutes and regulations for
each state. Although every state requires some type of agency disclosure, it does
not always have to be written. The few states where disclosure may be presented
verbally are identiﬁed by the VerbalOnly variable. Verbal disclosure may be less
precise than written agency disclosure, easier for buyers to forget, and more
difﬁcult for regulators to verify; hence, its inclusion in the model.
Even when disclosure is written, it can take different forms. Our research revealed
that there are three basic types of written disclosure documents currently in use.
In some states an ofﬁcial form has been drafted and made publicly available on
the website of the real estate regulatory authority (also commonly referred to
as real estate commissions). Those states are identiﬁed by the variable
Standardized Form. Every broker in these states is recommended to use the same
standardized form. It is worth mentioning that when mandatory forms are posted
on the website of the real estate regulatory agency, they are easily accessible by
prospective buyers and sellers and commonly included in the content of pre-
license education courses.
Other states provide speciﬁc wording to be used in disclosure documents, however
this language is written within the state code and may not be available as a
separate form adopted by the real estate regulatory agency. In this case, individual
brokerage ofﬁces must locate and extract the speciﬁc wording from the state code
and draft a disclosure form that will be used by their employees. The remaining
states simply mandate agency disclosure, but provide neither a standardized form
nor mandatory wording. In almost every case, the regional or local associations
of Realtors have developed disclosure forms that are available for use by their
members. Our principal concern here is whether standardized disclosure
documents that are widely available are more effective disclosure instruments than
non-standardized, heterogeneous forms.
There can also be differences in the timing of disclosure. In some states it is
commonly accepted to simply acknowledge within the purchase contract whether
the real estate agent actually represented the buyer or the seller during the
transaction.6 In such cases, buyers may not ﬁnd out whom, if anyone, the broker
represented until virtually all the negotiations have ended. Most states, however,
require that agency disclosure be provided at the earliest practical point. While
the actual wording may vary, such as ‘‘at the initial contact’’ or ‘‘before any
material information is provided,’’ brokers in these states are clearly expected to
provide disclosure before any conﬁdential information is exchanged between the
buyer and broker. The states where agency disclosure cannot be deferred to
contract signing are identiﬁed by the Early Disclosure variable.
Educational standards should also play a role in ensuring that real estate brokers
and salespersons understand agency relationships and disclosure requirements.Agency Disclosure in the Real Estate Transaction  271
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To address this, we collected candidate handbooks and examined educational
standards in detail for each state. The national median for the number of pre-
license education hours required to take the real estate salesperson exam is
currently 60 hours. The variable 60Hours identiﬁes 20 states that require more
than 60 hours of pre-license education.
Pancak and Sirmans (2007) point out that pre-license education is heavily focused
on preparing students to successfully pass the license exam. Most candidate
handbooks provide an outline of the exam content and weighting. As a result, pre-
license education courses often dedicate more attention to topics that are the most
likely to appear on the exam. Pancak and Sirmans identify 38 states where there
is some reference to agency disclosure in the content outline. We include this
information in our study as the Disclosure Section variable.7
Even after laws have been passed, forms adopted, and brokers educated, agency
disclosure policies may become ineffective absent proper enforcement. Regulation
and enforcement efforts are very difﬁcult to measure from one state to the next.
Real estate regulatory authorities have a number of disciplinary tools at their
disposal such as monetary ﬁnes, license suspensions, probation, and even license
revocation. However, regulators also have wide latitude with respect to the severity
of the penalties they levy for particular violations of license law and regulations
so it can be quite difﬁcult to measure enforcement effectively.8 As one possible
measure of enforcement effectiveness within a state, we consider the variable
Regulatory Staff. This variable calculates the total number of staff employed by
the real estate regulatory authority per 1,000 actively-licensed salespersons. The
data used to create this variable are collected from ARELLO’s Digest of Real
Estate Licensing Laws and Current Issues for years 2001 to 2006, corresponding
with the sample period of our data. Since the number of employees and active
licensees for each state changes during our sample period, we use the average
annual staff size and average number of salespersons for each state. We would
expect that the larger the staff relative to the number of active salespersons, the
greater the resources that can be devoted to enforcement. The values for the
Regulatory Staff variable are only available for 36 states and range from 0.16 to
7.67 commission employees per 1,000 active salespersons.
Another possible enforcement proxy is the composition of a real estate regulatory
board. Currently, there are 15 states where at least four-ﬁfths of the board
commissioners are required by statute to hold active real estate licenses. These
states are identiﬁed by the Broker Dominated variable. As Broback (2006) points
out, this requirement makes real estate one of the few professions where the
regulatory board is dominated by active industry participants. Could what is
basically industry enforcement result in a more passive form of regulation and/or
less rigorous enforcement compared to non-industry dominated regulatory
environment?
The data for the different states are merged with the survey results to complete
the sample used in this study. Exhibit 2 provides summary statistics for each of272  Wiley and Zumpano
Exhibit 2  Summary Statistics
Full Sample % Reporting Disclosure
Variable Mean Std. Dev. If Variable  1 If Variable  0 t-test of Differences
Disclosure 0.755 0.430 100.0% 0.0%
Y2002 0.020 0.140 70.1% 75.7% 2.50**
Y2003 0.092 0.288 72.6% 75.8% 3.07***
Y2004 0.245 0.430 74.5% 75.9% 1.94*
Y2005 0.226 0.418 73.7% 76.1% 3.39***
Y2006 0.244 0.429 77.0% 75.1% 2.90***
Buyer Rep 0.720 0.449 82.5% 58.8% 30.94***
First Home 0.392 0.488 71.8% 78.0% 10.17***
65&Older 0.055 0.228 69.5% 75.9% 4.67***
Asian 0.040 0.195 70.0% 75.8% 3.62***
Hispanic 0.053 0.223 70.3% 75.8% 3.95***
Standardized Form 0.291 0.454 79.4% 74.0% 8.79***
Early Disclosure 0.688 0.463 75.5% 75.7% 0.32
Verbal Only 0.094 0.292 70.1% 76.1% 5.65***
60 Hours 0.463 0.499 76.3% 74.9% 2.49**
Disclosure Section 0.841 0.366 75.9% 74.9% 1.22
Broker Dominated 0.598 0.550 74.2% 75.9% 2.28**
Regulatory Staff 1.987 1.494 n/a n/a n/a
Notes: For the full sample, N  21,755.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
these variables, including the percentage of respondents reporting having received
agency disclosure and a t-test of the statistical signiﬁcance of the difference.
Exhibit 3 provides a ranking of the states according to the percentage of disclosure
reported during the six-year period. North Dakota is at the top of the list with
100% disclosure reported, and Indiana is at the bottom with 59.9% of the
respondents reporting disclosure.
Many of the variables that measure the impact of state-related policies are coded
binary for each state. It is shown in Exhibit 4 that several of these variables are
highly correlated. As a result, it presents serious multicollinearity problems if an
all-inclusive equation were estimated. We observe signiﬁcant swings in parameter
estimates when any two variables with a correlation coefﬁcient higher than 0.30















































































1 North Dakota 100.0% 24 25 Utah 75.2% 129
2 Vermont 93.3% 15 26 Delaware 74.7% 75
3 New Hampshire 88.8% 249 27 New Jersey 74.6% 735
4 Connecticut 86.5% 423 28 Virginia 73.9% 1,283
5 North Carolina 86.1% 1,658 29 Tennessee 73.5% 820
6 Alaska 85.2% 27 30 Florida 73.4% 1,440
7 Maine 84.6% 221 31 Texas 72.5% 1,572
8 Idaho 84.5% 84 32 Georgia 72.3% 188
9 Minnesota 83.4% 673 33 California 72.2% 1,359
10 Mississippi 83.3% 72 34 Alabama 71.7% 99
11 Ohio 82.7% 729 35 Illinois 71.1% 906
12 Missouri 81.9% 647 36 Oregon 70.5% 515
13 South Carolina 80.8% 125 37 Nevada 70.4% 135
13 Massachusetts 80.8% 686 38 New Mexico 69.6% 69
15 Colorado 80.1% 708 39 Iowa 68.9% 251
16 West Virginia 80.0% 25 40 Louisiana 68.4% 76
16 Wyoming 80.0% 25 41 District of Columbia 67.7% 93
18 Kentucky 79.8% 84 42 Wisconsin 66.9% 860



















Exhibit 3  (continued)












20 Nebraska 79.4% 68 44 Oklahoma 65.6% 119
21 Maryland 78.1% 823 45 Arizona 64.8% 327
21 Pennsylvania 78.1% 680 46 Hawaii 63.6% 11
23 Arkansas 77.5% 80 47 Washington 63.3% 698
24 Rhode Island 76.0% 179 48 Indiana 59.9% 521
Note: Due to data limitations, South Dakota, Montana, and Kansas are not included.Agency Disclosure in the Real Estate Transaction  275
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Verbal Only 0.210 0.479 1
60 Hours 0.124 0.014 0.278 1
Disclosure
Section
0.079 0.239 0.140 0.123 1
Broker
Dominated
0.381 0.138 0.146 0.057 0.133
Regulatory
Staff
0.029 0.377 0.143 0.335 0.312 0.190 1
results of four unique models in Exhibit 5. The third and fourth models are
presented as an alternative to an all-inclusive estimation. Each of the state-related
policy variables in the fourth model are highly correlated with at least one variable
from the third model. Together, the results of these estimations provide a
consolidated analysis for the impact of each of the state-related policy variables.9
 Empirical Results
The results of the binary logistic regressions are shown in Exhibit 5. The ﬁrst
model contains individual buyer characteristics, situational factors, and dummy
variables to control for the timing of the annual surveys and changing economic
conditions. The model includes indicator variables for each year, except 2001. It
is interesting to note that for every model shown in Exhibit 5, the year coefﬁcients
are all negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level (relative to 2001). This
result indicates that the agency disclosure problems ﬁrst noted by Wiley and
Zumpano (2006) for 2004 were not unique, but appear chronic, with no evidence
of improvement in the reported levels of disclosure over time. Similarly, the results
from the expanded sample of NAR surveys from 2001 through 2006 continue to
indicate that potentially disadvantaged groups such as ﬁrst-time home buyers,
buyers aged 65 and older, Hispanics, and Asian buyers are all signiﬁcantly less
likely to report having received a written agency disclosure form during the
purchase transaction.10
The second model in Exhibit 5 examines the impact of a standardized disclosure



















Exhibit 5  Results from Binary Logistic Regression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable Coeff. Z-Statistic Coeff. Z-Statistic Coeff. Z-Statistic Coeff. Z-Statistic
Intercept 0.785*** 14.06 0.765*** 13.67 0.657*** 7.97 0.648*** 9.64
Y2002 0.405*** 3.16 0.498*** 3.88 0.520*** 3.86 0.319*** 1.61
Y2003 0.368*** 4.90 0.455*** 6.00 0.439*** 5.71 0.511*** 5.95
Y2004 0.324*** 5.08 0.431*** 6.62 0.434*** 6.61 0.288*** 3.81
Y2005 0.329*** 5.41 0.396*** 6.45 0.420*** 6.73 0.370*** 5.14
Y2006 0.142** 2.33 0.240*** 3.85 0.225*** 3.54 0.166*** 2.43
Buyer Rep 1.232*** 32.61 1.228*** 32.42 1.234*** 32.08 1.277*** 27.92
First Home 0.413*** 10.80 0.419*** 10.92 0.415*** 10.66 0.399*** 8.62
65&Older 0.422*** 5.54 0.414*** 5.43 0.409*** 5.29 0.415*** 4.56
Asian 0.269*** 3.03 0.238*** 2.67 0.257*** 2.86 0.286*** 2.76
Hispanic 0.230*** 2.88 0.191** 2.38 0.194** 2.38 0.226** 2.49
Standardized Form 0.351*** 8.19 0.377*** 8.24
Early Disclosure 0.039 0.88
Verbal Only 0.716*** 6.38
60 Hours 0.106*** 2.72



































































Exhibit 5  (continued)
Results from Binary Logistic Regression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable Coeff. Z-Statistic Coeff. Z-Statistic Coeff. Z-Statistic Coeff. Z-Statistic
Broker Dominated 0.045 0.59
Regulatory Staff 0.105*** 4.56
Pearson goodness-of-ﬁt: 189.106*** 288.712*** 1,033.813*** 1,508.617***
# of observations 17,496 17,496 17,133 12,214
Notes: Disclosure is the dependent variable.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.278  Wiley and Zumpano
that in states where real estate regulators have adopted a standard form and made
it publicly available on their website, the incidence of buyers reporting disclosure
is signiﬁcantly higher. Standardized Form is positive and highly signiﬁcant, and
measured relative to the alternative scenarios where either speciﬁc wording is only
written within the state code, or where the local board of Realtors has adopted a
form for their members to use. Although every buyer, seller, and parcel of real
estate is unique in one way or another, the nature of the paperwork that real estate
agents provide to clients and customers during the transaction has become very
regular. Virtually every brokerage ofﬁce has a collection of forms that can be used
in a majority of real estate transactions. When state regulators create a standard
agency disclosure form and make it publicly available online, it is much more
likely that this form will ﬁnd its way into the collection of forms and training
manuals commonly used by practicing agents. However, when the speciﬁc
wording is only provided within the state code, there is no signiﬁcant improvement
compared to states that lack a mandatory disclosure format.
The third model in Exhibit 5 examines the impact of current educational standards
on the reported levels of agency disclosure. This estimation shows that the
likelihood of agency disclosure being reported is signiﬁcantly higher in states that
require more than 60 hours of pre-license education. The 60Hours variable is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. One of the deﬁning
characteristics of the real estate sales profession is the low barriers to entry, in
terms of both time and expense, relative to occupational income potential, with
some states requiring only 20 hours of pre-license education. Obviously, states
that demand more hours of pre-license education offer instructors a better
opportunity to cover essential course material.
The third model in Exhibit 5 also provides support for the argument from Pancak
and Sirmans (2007) that pre-license education may be heavily inﬂuenced by the
questions expected to appear on the exams. It is shown here that states experience
signiﬁcantly higher levels of disclosure when the candidate exam handbook
references agency disclosure in the exam content outline. Even though disclosure
laws have been passed and agency relationships have been carefully redeﬁned
over the last 20 years, the exams in many states may have changed very little in
recent years. The Disclosure Section variable proxies for states that have recently
updated their exam content on the topics of agency relationships and disclosure.
The exam content may also act as a signal that agency disclosure is an important
issue to regulators.
In addition, the third model in Exhibit 5 considers the timing of the legal
requirement for agency disclosure. It has been argued that allowing agency
disclosure late in the negotiating process may be equivalent to and no better than
no disclosure at all (see Wiley and Zumpano, 2006). In model 3, the Early
Disclosure variable is insigniﬁcant from zero. It turns out that homebuyers in these
states report disclosure at the same rate as buyers in states where early disclosure
is required. However, late disclosure may still result in buyers inadvertently
revealing material information to sellers that could adversely affect their
negotiating position.Agency Disclosure in the Real Estate Transaction  279
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The fourth model in Exhibit 5 examines enforcement issues, along with the impact
of allowing only a verbal form of agency disclosure. In states where agents are
only required to provide a verbal presentation of the agency disclosure, buyers
are signiﬁcantly less likely to report having received a written form of agency
disclosure. The wording of the NAR survey question regarding agency disclosure
asks only whether a written agency disclosure form was received by the buyer;
thus we cannot tell if buyers received verbal disclosure in those states that do not
require the use of a written disclosure document. This result suggests that brokers
in these states may be doing only the minimum required by law. It could be argued
that buyers may be less likely to fully understand agency disclosure when it is
not accompanied by a written explanation.
The fourth model in Exhibit 5 is also aimed at determining whether the structure
of the state regulatory board has an impact on agency disclosure levels and
includes the variable Broker Dominated. This result indicates that agency
disclosure levels are no different in states that require at least four-ﬁfths of their
license law ofﬁcials (commissioners) to hold active real estate licenses. Some have
argued that a regulatory board dominated by industry members may be more
lenient in enforcing agency disclosure statutes (see Broback, 2006).12 Our research
provides no evidence to support this argument. Broker-dominated regulatory
boards do not appear to have a signiﬁcant impact on the reported levels of
disclosure.
Finally, the fourth model in Exhibit 5 ﬁnds that Regulatory Staff has a positive
and signiﬁcant impact on the estimated probability of disclosure. This suggests
that as the amount of resources available to real estate regulatory authorities
increase, so does the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement. Hence, understafﬁng
can result in a lower incidence of agency disclosure.
 Conclusions & Policy Recommendations
Despite the passage of agency disclosure statutes by every state, disclosure has
yet to prove universally successful. Six years worth of data indicates that the non-
disclosure problem shows no sign of mitigating and appears chronic. Certain
disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, ﬁrst-time home buyers,
and certain minorities, continue to report a lower incidence of disclosure than the
general population. This research provides some insight into why this is the case
by identifying factors that inﬂuence the probability of agency disclosure.
More demanding pre-license education requirements increase the probability of
disclosure, as does increased emphasis on agency education and disclosure
questions within license exams. When not legally required to do so, brokers and
salespersons do not generally provide written disclosure documents to consumers.
Competition among brokers does not appear, in and of itself, to create an incentive
to use written disclosure forms. If real estate regulators want to encourage written
disclosure they will have to mandate it. Interestingly, the composition of real estate280  Wiley and Zumpano
commissions does not have a deterministic impact on disclosure. Agency
disclosure is equally likely under a broker-dominated regulatory agency compared
to their more independently-regulated neighbors. It is important to note, but also
not surprising to ﬁnd, that the greater the resources available to regulators, the
greater the effectiveness of enforcement efforts.
The type of written disclosure is shown to also be a very important determinant
of disclosure. In particular, when written disclosure forms are sanctioned by
regulators and made publicly available on the website of the real estate regulator,
the incidence of agency disclosure increases. The implications of this research are
very straightforward. For states that have not already done so, real estate license
law ofﬁcials should consider adopting a standard agency disclosure form to be
used by real estate brokers and make it publicly available on their website. Exhibit
6 provides a summary of the states where this practice has been adopted.
States should also closely examine their educational standards for real estate
salespersons. In some states, the pre-license exams have not been updated for a
number of years (see Pancak and Sirmans, 2007). Current exam content should
reﬂect changes in agency and brokerage relationships that have taken place in
recent years. Pre-license real estate courses should be quickly modiﬁed to explain
such changes. In addition, instructors must have sufﬁcient time to adequately cover
all of the material expected for the course.
In combination with broker education, agency laws must be properly enforced in
order for agency disclosure to become commonplace in the real estate transaction.
Where non-compliance is the problem, state regulatory agencies need to evaluate
the effectiveness of their enforcement efforts. Commission staff size relative to
the salesperson population proved to have a highly signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
probability of disclosure. As the real estate sales profession continues to grow and
more inexperienced agents enter the market, each state should consider whether
their real estate regulatory authority has enough resources to effectively regulate
the profession.
Earlier research has shown that a large number of home buyers surveyed by NAR
did not know whether they actually received a written disclosure form. It is also
evident that certain homebuyers remain at a disadvantage as far as disclosure is
concerned. It is likely that at least some of the survey respondents who indicated
they did not receive a disclosure form actually did. Most states now recognize
many different types of brokerage arrangements and, as a result, the concept of
agency representation has become very complicated. Here the problem may not
be compliance, but comprehension. It is likely that many agency disclosure forms
are commonly perceived as ‘‘part of the paperwork,’’ making them much more
difﬁcult to identify when buyers are asked to recall this information once the
transaction is complete. It may well be that some consumers did not know that
what they signed was a disclosure form and responded accordingly in the surveys.
Regulators should encourage earlier disclosure, along with making their disclosure
forms more informative and easier to understand, thereby helping to ensure thatAgency Disclosure in the Real Estate Transaction  281
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Alabama X X 0 0 0 0 2.91
Alaska X X 0 0 0 0 3.03
Arizona 0 0 0 X X 0 2.08
Arkansas X X 0 0 X 0 2.89
California 0 X 0 0 X 0 1.28
Colorado X X 0 X X X *
Connecticut X X 0 0 X 0 0.50
Delaware X X 0 X X 0 0.40
District of Columbia 0 X 0 0 0 0 0.61
Florida 0 X 0 X 0 0 0.68
Georgia 0 0 0 X 0 X 0.89
Hawaii 0 0 0 0 X 0 *
Idaho X X 0 X X X 3.40
Illinois 0 0 0 0 X 0 0.80
Indiana 0 X 0 0 X X *
Iowa X X 0 0 X 0 0.42
Kansas X X 0 0 X 0 1.34
Kentucky X X 0 X X X 1.57
Louisiana X X 0 X X X 2.40
Maine X X 0 0 X 0 4.06
Maryland X X 0 0 X 0 0.51
Massachusetts X X 0 0 X 0 *
Michigan 0 X 0 0 0 0 0.16
Minnesota 0 X 0 X X 0 *
Mississippi X X 0 0 0 X 3.48
Missouri X 0 0 0 X X 1.19
Montana 0 0 0 0 X 0 *
Nebraska X X 0 0 0 0 3.01
Nevada X X 0 X X X 3.21
New Hampshire X X 0 0 X 0 *
New Jersey 0 0 0 X X 0 0.55
New Mexico 0 0 X X X X 2.63
New York 0 X 0 0 * 0 *
North Carolina 0 0 0 X X 0 3.43
North Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 *282  Wiley and Zumpano
Exhibit 6  (continued)
















Ohio X X 0 X X X *
Oklahoma X 0 0 0 * X 2.43
Oregon X X 0 X 0 0 *
Pennsylvania 0 X 0 0 X 0 0.25
Rhode Island 0 X 0 0 X 0 1.27
South Carolina X X 0 0 X 0 1.23
South Dakota X X 0 X X 0 7.67
Tennessee 0 X 0 0 X 0 1.30
Texas 0 X 0 X X 0 1.57
Utah 0 0 0 X X X 2.11
Vermont X X 0 0 X 0 2.06
Virginia 0 0 X 0 X 0 *
Washington 0 0 X 0 X X 2.04
West Virginia X X 0 X * X *
Wisconsin 0 X 0 X X 0 *
Wyoming 0 X 0 0 X 0 3.94
all buyers fully comprehend the information given them during the home purchase
process.
 Endnotes
1 The FTC (1984) study also found that 74.4% of sellers listing through the MLS thought
that selling brokers represented buyers.
2 This transition is documented in detail by several papers, including Olazabal (2003),
Pancak and Sirmans (2006), and Pancak, Miceli, and Sirmans (1997), to name a few.
3 The survey data used by Wiley and Zumpano (2006) did not contain enough information
to develop a formal model of agency disclosure.
4 The survey results for the 2002 survey are combined with the results of the 2003 survey,
and the year in which the responses were reported is provided.
5 The ‘‘Don’t know/Not sure’’ response is an important and informative category in its
own right. In our sample, it made up 17.8% of the respondents who answered the
disclosure question. Such a high number suggests that there is a serious problem with
the agency disclosure delivery system. When combined with the number of respondents
who reported no disclosure, these two categories made up 37.9% of the responses.Agency Disclosure in the Real Estate Transaction  283
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6 For example, in Georgia and Hawaii the speciﬁc wording is provided within the state
code to be incorporated as a clause within the contract for buyers to acknowledge the
nature of agency representation by the broker. However, it appears that no standardized
disclosure form has been adopted by the real estate commission for brokers to use prior
to the contract being written.
7 Due to a lack of information, this estimate was unavailable for Alabama, California,
Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, and West Virginia.
8 An alternative measure of enforcement effectiveness would be the number of
disciplinary actions per state as a percentage of the number of residential sales per state.
Pancak and Sirmans in a 2006 article in the Journal of Housing Research use this ratio
as a measure of the quality of brokerage services. The inclusion of such a variable in
the model presented here, however, could present endogeneity problems since it would
be impacted by such things as state educational requirements, disclosure requirements,
and pre-license exam questions.
9 Each of the results for the state-related policy variables have been veriﬁed empirically
by estimating the impact on Disclosure both individually and in combination with other
independent variables.
10 No signiﬁcant difference in the incidence of disclosure was found between Black/
African American and White/Caucasian homebuyers.
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